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The International Labour Organization's Role in
Nationalizing the International Movement to Abolish
Child Labor
Junlin Ho*
I. INTRODUCTION
Despite public support for ending the worst forms of child labor and
increased awareness regarding the issue, child labor remains a global problem.'
Organizations such as the International Labour Organization ("ILO") have been
attempting to address this problem by monitoring progress in various countries,
collecting and publishing data on child labor, and providing technical assistance
to help governments curtail child labor, particularly its worst forms.' These
additional strategies have only yielded slow progress. Observers have indicated
that the main problem is the ILO's inability or unwillingness to impose
enforcement measures on its members.3 Some have argued for creating a
connection between world trade policies and labor standards-a trade-labor
linkage-to resolve international labor violations, including the problem of child
* SB 2001, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; JD Candidate 2007, The University of Chicago.
I would like to thank CJIL for editing assistance and in particular Gus Hotis for his invaluable
comments. Special thanks to Derrick Ang for his support and encouragement. I would also like to
thank Jenia Iontcheva Turner, whose article Nationaliing International CriminalLaw, 41 Stan J Intl L
1 (2005), provided inspiration for the title and ideas in this Development.
I See US Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report, 50-230 (2005), available online at
<http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2005> (visited Apr 22, 2006); ILO, The End of Child
Labour Within Reach (2006), available online at <http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/
ipec/about/globalreport/2006/download/2006_globalreport-en.pdf> (visited May 15, 2006);
Ousseini Issa, Gold Miners E4loit Children, Inter Press Service (Aug 26, 2005), available online at
<http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/inequal/labor/2005/O826amadou.htm> (visited Apr 22,
2006).
2 ILO, International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour (IPEC) (2003), available online at
<http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/ipec/intro/> (visited Apr 22, 2006).
3 Michael J. Trebilcock and Robert Howse, Trade Poij 6 Labor Standards, 14 Minn J Global Trade
261, 274 (2005); Daniel S. Ehrenberg, The Labor Link: Applying the International Trading System to
Enforce Violations of Forced and Child Labor, 20 Yale J Intl L 361, 389 (1995).
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labor.4 Advocates of trade-labor linkage have argued for either a stronger
enforcement mechanism within the ILO such as trade sanctions or the addition
of a labor clause to the World Trade Organization ("WTO").5 Both arguments
have failed, however, due to lack of support for such measures within the
membership of the ILO and WTO.6
International law advocates often envision a powerful set of global laws
supported by a system of enforcement that provides "teeth" to these laws. Much
like the defenders of trade-labor linkage who argue for more concrete
enforcement mechanisms, many international law proponents advocate the need
for a strong international court system.7 Some thought the creation of the
International Criminal Court ("ICC") represented the dawning of such a system,
but the ICC has received only qualified support globally and in some cases,
absolutely no support.' Given the limited backing it has received, it is unlikely
the ICC will become a strong independent international court. As the practical
realities set in, one legal scholar has argued that the ICC should instead move
toward becoming a hybrid court, or an international body that relies on "national
authorities to enforce international criminal law."9 A hybrid court can be more
functional since "[a] less hierarchical international criminal justice system that
relies significantly on national governments is likely to be better informed by
diverse perspectives, more acceptable to local populations, and more effective in
accomplishing its ultimate goals."'
This hybrid court theory is equally salient when applied to the abolition of
child labor. The WTO has explicitly rejected any sort of trade-labor linkage and
there are doubts about the ILO's ability to implement such a regime given its
desire to prevent states from withdrawing their membership in the ILO."
4 Brian A. Langille, Eight Ways to Think about International Labour Standards, 31 J World Trade 27, 34-
53 (1997).
5 See Kimberly Ann Elliott and Richard B. Freeman, Can Labor Standards Improve under Globalization?
(Inst Intl Econ 2003); Steve Charnovitz, The Influence of International Labour Standards on the World
Trading Regime: A Historical Overview, 126 Intl Labour Rev 565 (1987).
6 See Trebilcock and Howse, 14 MinnJ Global Trade at 262 (cited in note 3); Jonathan P. Hiatt and
Deborah Greenfield, The Importance of Core Labor Rights in World Development, 26 Mich J Ind L 39, 46
(2004).
7 See M. Cherif Bassiouni, From Versailles to Rwanda in Seventy-Five Years: The Need to Establish a
Permanent International Criminal Court, 10 Harv Hum Rts J 11, 49-62 (1997); Bryan F. MacPherson,
Building an International Criminal Courtfor the 21st CentuT, 13 Conn J Intl L 1, 3 (1998).
8 See Jack Goldsmith, The Self-Defeating International Criminal Court, 70 U Chi L Rev 89 (2003).
9 Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Nationalijng International Criminal Law, 41 Stan J Intl L 1, 3 (2005).
10 Id at 1.
I WTO, Understanding the WIFTO: Cross-Cutting and New Issues-Labour Standards: Higbl Controversial,
available online at <http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif e/bey5_e.htm>
(visited Apr 22, 2006); Trebilcock and Howse, 14 Minn J Global Trade at 284 (cited in note 3).
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Despite these enforcement issues, the ILO's tripartite structure, comprised of
governments, employers, and worker groups, still allows it to effectively monitor
child labor conditions and report on child labor violations. 2 Given the difficulty
of reaching a multilateral international consensus, this Development argues
that-much like the theory of a decentralized, hybrid international court-
concerned parties should pursue a trade-labor linkage to end child labor at a
national level. Although countries have already begun to implement trade-labor
linkage through unilateral trade preferences and bilateral trade agreements, the
use of ILO international labor standards and reports in the trade-labor linkage
evaluation process represents the critical component. This Development argues
that the ILO is uniquely positioned to help in nationalizing the international
movement to abolish child labor. The ILO's tripartite structure gives it access to
current child labor conditions in all of its member states, which, in turn, allows
for more comprehensive reporting. Its history, structure, and transparency
legitimize the ILO, making its standards and reporting a critical part of creating
and enforcing trade-labor linkage at the national level.
This Development introduces the concept of a decentralized trade-labor
link based on ILO standards and reporting as an effective means for ending
child labor. Part II of the Development defines the concept of child labor and
provides current statistics on the number of children involved in it, including the
worst forms of child labor. Part III discusses the history and structure of the
ILO, the organization's commitment to abolishing child labor, and how these
factors make the ILO uniquely positioned to monitor child labor violations. Part
IV lays out the principle of trade-labor linkage, the inability of the international
community in creating and implementing trade-labor linkage, and how individual
parties in the United States have begun to implement such a link on a national
level based on ILO standards and reporting. In conclusion, the Development
argues that given the practical realities of the ILO and WTO, a decentralized
national system of trade-labor linkage using ILO standards and reports to
determine labor compliance is a more effective means of abolishing child labor
than the theory of an international trade-labor linkage.
II. DEFINING THE PROBLEM OF CHILD LABOR
Child labor is a continuing global problem. The ILO has classified four
types of child labor as the "worst forms" of child labor: (1) all forms of slavery
or practices similar to slavery such as the sale and trafficking of children and
forced or compulsory labor including recruitment of children for armed conflict;
(2) use of children in prostitution or pornography; (3) use of children for illicit
12 Trebilcock and Howse, 14 Minn J Global Trade at 262 (cited in note 3).
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activities such as the production and trafficking of drugs; and (4) work
hazardous to the health, safety, or morals of children. 3
In May 2006, the ILO released a report on the current status of child labor
around the world. The first three types of worst form child labor are considered
"unconditional worst forms" of child labor, and according to the report, the
ILO estimates that 8 million children are involved in these forms of labor.14 In
2004, approximately 191 million children under the age of 15 were working; of
these, over 74 million were involved in hazardous child labor-the fourth type
of worst form child labor. 5 The ILO further estimates that in 2000, 1.2 million
children were victims of trafficking, ultimately exploited for commercial sex or
put into slavery-like work conditions. 6
Countries have come to recognize the growing issue of child labor and the
role their governments can play in resolving the problem. The number of
countries that have ratified international conventions addressing child labor
concerns serves as an indicator of the increasing global commitment. The 1989
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child has been ratified by all
but two countries-the United States and Somalia. 7 The ILO Worst Forms of
Child Labour Convention (No 182) and the Minimum Age Convention (No
138) have both been ratified by over 75 percent of the ILO member states. 18 But
just as there is support for ending child labor, there also have been incidences of
countries actively practicing some of the worst forms of child labor. 9 The
problem is not a lack of public support for ending child labor; rather, lack of
enforcement upon discovery of violations has slowed the reform process.20
13 ILO, Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999, Convention 182, art 3, available online at
<http://www.ilocarib.org.tt/childlabour/c182.htm> (visited Apr 22, 2006).
14 ILO, The End of Child Labour at 43 (cited in note 1).
15 Id at 6.
16 UNICEF, End Child Exploitation: Child Labour Today (2005), available online at <http://
www.unicef.org.uk/publications/pdf/ECECHILD2_A4.pdf> (visited Apr 22, 2006).
17 Human Rights Education Associates, The Rights of Children & Youth, available online at <http://
www.hrea.org/leam/guides/children.html> (visited Apr 22, 2006).
is ILO, ILOLEX Database ofInternational Labour Standards, available online at <http://www.ilo.org/
ilolex/english/newratframeE.htm> (visited Apr 22, 2006).
19 ILO, Forced Labour Persists in Myanmar. ILO Apples Extraordinagy Constitutional Procedures, Doc No
ILO/00/9 (Mar 29, 2000), available online at <http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/inf/
pr/2000/9.htm> (visited Apr 22, 2006).
20 Myanmar is a good example of the ILO's inability to impose enforcement measures upon child
labor violators despite the "egregious and well documented" violations. Elliott and Freeman, Can
Labor Standards Improve under Globakzation? (cited in note 5).
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III. THE ILO AS MONITOR OF CHILD LABOR VIOLATIONS
In order to understand why the ILO is uniquely situated to monitor and
report on child labor violations, we must look at the history and framework of
the ILO. The organization dates back to 1919 when it was created by the Treaty
of Versailles. From the start, its mission has focused on the promotion of social
justice through international labor rights.
Since its creation, the ILO has always had a tripartite structure including
governments, employers, and workers' groups. The main body of the ILO is the
Conference, which is comprised of all the member states. Each member state in
the Conference is represented by two government representatives, one employer
representative, and one worker representative. The ILO is managed by its
Governing Body, which makes decisions on ILO policy. Both the Conference
and the Governing Body consist of equal numbers of government
representatives and employer and worker representatives. Membership in the
ILO is purely voluntary and the organization balances its role as monitor and
reporter of labor conditions and violations in member states with the desire to
ensure that countries do not withdraw from the ILO.
The ILO's tripartite structure allows it to effectively monitor and report
child labor conditions in various countries. Employer and worker groups can
raise complaints regarding any governmental violations of previously ratified
international labor conventions. The organization's constitution lists out an
extensive process for reporting labor violations, monitoring labor conditions,
and issuing recommendations on ways to resolve violations and improve
working environments.21
The ILO is structured with significant monitoring and reporting powers,
but Article 33 of the ILO's Constitution also gives the organization certain
enforcement powers.2 ' Historically though, the ILO has only invoked its Article
33 provision once.23 Instead, the organization has relied on less confrontational
methods such as public shaming through documentation in ILO reports and
technical expertise and financial assistance to promote compliance with its
international labor standards.24
21 See ILO Const (1994), arts 24-32, available online at <http://www.ilo.org/public/english/
about/iloconst.htm> (visited Apr 22, 2006).
22 "In the event of any Member failing to carry out within the time specified the
recommendations ... the Governing Body may recommend to the Conference such action as it
may deem wise and expedient to secure compliance therewith." Id at art 33.
23 ILO, Forced Labour Persists in Myanmar (cited in note 19).
24 Trebilcock and Howse, 14 Minn J Global Trade at 274 (cited in note 3); see also Ehrenberg, 20
YaleJ Intl L at 388-89 (cited in note 3).
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Abolition of child labor is now considered part of a core set of labor
principles. International labor standards have traditionally been created by the
ILO through a system of conventions that required ratification by each member
state in order to be binding upon that government. But in 1998, the ILO
changed this entire process by declaring four "fundamental" labor rights binding
upon its members regardless of convention ratification. The four principles
include: (1) freedom of association and free collective bargaining; (2) the
elimination of forced or compulsory labor; (3) the abolition of child labor; and
(4) the elimination of employment discrimination. In so declaring, the ILO
reaffirmed its commitment to ending child labor and set forth an obligation
upon its members "to promote and to realize" these principles.2" The
Declaration was unanimously ratified by the ILO's member states.26 As a further
indication of international support, over 150 of the ILO's 178 member states
have ratified the convention on the Worst Forms of Child Labour since its
adoption in 1999.27 This number is well above the ILO's average of twenty
21
ratifications per convention adopted in the last twenty-five years.
The ILO remains focused on child labor issues and encourages compliance
from its member states through a system involving the mild stick of public
shaming and the mild carrot of financial assistance. Part of this process involves
issuing numerous reports documenting local labor conditions including both
improvements and continued violations in member states. Its tripartite structure
gives the ILO several benefits-the workers' groups give it access to
information on current labor conditions, while the employers' groups and
governments lend it legitimacy with both private and public actors. Due to its
existing global monitoring framework and its ability to communicate with both
private and public actors that are in violation of labor standards, the ILO is
uniquely positioned to monitor and report on child labor violations.
25 ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, 86th Sess (June 1998),
available online at <http://www.ilo.org/dyn/dedaris/DECLARATIONWEB.static_jumpvar
_language=EN&var-pagename=DECLARATIONTEXT> (visited Apr 22, 2006); see Brian A.
Langille, Core Labour Rights-Tbe True Sto (Rep# to Alston), 16 Eur J Intl L 409, 414-15 (2005);
Sandra Polaski, Protecting Labor Rights through Trade Agreements: An Analytical Guide, 10 UC Davis J
Intl L & Poly 13, 17 (2003).
26 Hatt and Greenfield, 26 Mich J Intl L at 43 (cited in note 6).
27 ILO, ILOLEX Database of International Labour Standards (cited in note 18).
28 See Langille, 16 Eur J Intl L at 425 (cited in note 25).
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IV. TRADE-LABOR LINKAGE
A. HISTORY
Advocates of creating international trade-labor linkage have been around
for many years.29 Nevertheless, not much has occurred at the international level
thus far because international trade-labor linkage remains a contentious theory.
30
Supporters of a trade-labor linkage have raised both competition-based and
human rights-based arguments. The competition argument is based on unfair
competition and a race to the bottom theory. Countries with lower labor
standards have lower production costs, which give them a competitive
advantage. Thus, countries will race to lower their standards in order to produce
lower cost products, allowing them to remain competitive 31 and attract foreign
investment. The human rights argument is that violations of core labor rights, as
enumerated by the ILO in its 1998 Declaration, constitute human rights
violations. By imposing a trade-labor linkage, nations are protecting the
oppressed, including children forced into labor, in countries that violate these
core labor standards. 32 When applied to child labor, the human rights-based
argument appears to have greater relevance, particularly with regard to the worst
forms of child labor.
The counterargument against trade-labor linkage relies on the theory of
protectionism. Defenders of this view, such as the WTO, argue that creating a
trade-labor link would allow more developed countries to "protect" their
interests by preventing less developed countries from maximizing their
comparative wage advantage. This, in turn, would slow economic growth in the
less developed countries-growth that could ultimately lead to improved living
conditions, including better labor standards. 33 But the theory does not address
the worst forms of child labor-work involving the use of children in forced
labor, prostitution, illicit activities, or hazardous tasks. It is difficult to argue that
countries seeking to protect children from such activities are engaging in
protectionist behavior. Scholars have observed that the protectionism argument
29 For a general discussion, see Chamovitz, 126 Intl Labour Rev 565 (cited in note 5).
30 See Kofi Addo, The Correlation between Labour Standards and International Trade: Which Way Forward?,
36(2) J World Trade 285 (2002); Keith E. Maskus, Sbould Core Labour Standards be Imposed through
International Trade Pol4g?, World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No 1817, available online
at <http://wdsbeta.worldbank.org/extemal/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2000/02/
24/000009265_3971110141359/Rendered/PDF/multitpage.pdf> (visited Apr 22, 2006).
31 Trebilcock and Howse, 14 Minn J Global Trade at 266-70 (cited in note 3).
32 Id at 271-72.
33 See Hiatt and Greenfield, 26 Mich J Intl L at 46-47 (cited in note 6).
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is being raised less often now as policy makers focus more on the human rights
aspect that could be achieved through trade-labor linkage.34
B. INTERNATIONAL TRADE-LABOR LINKAGE
Trade-labor linkage has been discussed frequently in the international arena
but to no avail. In its 1996 Singapore Ministerial Declaration, the WTO stated:
"We renew our commitment to the observance of internationally recognized
core labour standards. The [ILO] is the competent body to set and deal with
these standards, and we affirm our support for its work in promoting them."
35
In so doing, the WTO moved the labor discussion into the realm of the ILO
and has since refused to consider any sort of trade-labor linkage.36
To the ILO's credit, when the WTO shifted the focus of labor issues to the
ILO, the organization responded by undertaking additional conventions and
initiatives; however, the organization's effectiveness has been hampered by its
own set of organizational issues. The ILO's tripartite structure makes it uniquely
able to monitor and report on labor conditions in its member states, but it has
rarely utilized its Article 33 enforcement powers against any members found to
be violating child labor standards. Observers have speculated that this is due to
concerns that levying complaints against certain countries could be viewed as
hostile acts leading to retaliatory complaints being filed or the voluntary
withdrawal of the country from ILO membership.37 Some commentators have
attributed the ILO's success to the very fact that membership is voluntary; they
believe the organization would lose membership or that members would use
their votes to prevent additional initiatives from occurring if the ILO moved to a
sanctions-based system.38 Due to structural constraints, vesting additional
enforcement powers in the ILO beyond its current Article 33 powers seems
unlikely to create successful trade-labor linkage.
C. NATIONAL TRADE-LABOR LINKAGE BASED ON
ILO STANDARDS
Given the failure to create an international multilateral agreement on trade-
labor linkage and the likely continued opposition to the creation of such an
agreement, this Development asserts that the international community should
look elsewhere for trade-labor linkage. The proposal is for parties to focus
34 Trebilcock and Howse, 14 Minn J Global Trade at 300 (cited in note 3).
35 WTO, Singapore Ministerial Declaration § 4, WTO Doc No WT/MIN(96)/DEC (1996).
36 See Hiatt and Greenfield, 26 Mich J Intl L at 46-47 (cited in note 6).
37 See Ehrenberg, 20 Yale J Intl L at 389 (cited in note 3).
38 See Langille, 31 J World Trade at 49-50 (cited in note 4).
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instead on the creation of decentralized, national trade-labor linkage that
incorporates international core labor standards promulgated by the ILO-
specifically, the standard to abolish child labor. The legitimacy of the mechanism
lies in the method of monitoring compliance, which could be based on the
ILO's monitoring and reporting systems. Non-compliance with agreements
could be determined, not by individual parties, but by the ILO, or such
determinations could at least be based on reports issued by the ILO.
Public and private parties have already implemented successful national
level measures that create trade-labor linkage. This section analyzes some of the
public measures that have been implemented by the United States, which include
unilateral trade preferences and bilateral trade agreements.3
1. Unilateral Trade Preferences
The United States has implemented a generalized system of preferences
("GSP"), which provides trade benefits to countries that meet certain
requirements including compliance with international labor standards. But the
GSP, like the ILO, has faced enforcement issues.4 ° In addition, once the carrot
of trade benefits is withdrawn, the developing country loses all incentive to bring
its workforce into compliance with international labor standards.
The US GSP system has been criticized for the arbitrariness of its
implementation.4 This is not surprising given that many clauses in the statute
allow the president significant discretion in providing trade benefits to countries
that violate international labor standards. But the President's discretion is
significantly curtailed with regard to child labor. The GSP has adopted the ILO's
39 This Development focuses on the public measures implemented by the US government.
Although public measures implemented by other governments fall outside the scope of this
Development, they are equally relevant to the theory of creating a national trade-labor linkage. In
fact, the European Community was the first government to adopt a unilateral trade preference
system and has since incorporated the ILO's core labor standards into the preferences. See
Europa, Generalised System of Preferences-User's Guide to the European Union's Scheme of Generaised
Tariff Preferences, available online at <http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/global/gsp/
gspguide.htm> (visited Apr 22, 2006). In addition, private measures are becoming increasingly
important as companies implement corporate initiatives to reduce or eliminate child labor in the
supply chain. Actions by non-US public actors and private groups, although not discussed in this
Development, are likely to continue to play an important role in creating national trade-labor
linkage.
40 See Lisa G. Baltazar, Government Sanctions and Private Iniiaives: Striking a New Balance for U.S.
Enforrement of Internationally-Recognized Workers' Rigbts, 29 Colum Hum Rts L Rev 687, 691 (1998)
("PI]n spite of ILO findings that Malaysia has failed to implement ILO Conventions for over
twenty years, Malaysia remains a member of the ILO. Similarly, the U.S. continued trade
preferences to Malaysia for years in spite of ample evidence of such violations.").
41 Id at 690.
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definition of worst forms of child labor,42 and a country is ineligible for trade
benefits under the GSP if it "has not implemented its commitments to eliminate
the worst forms of child labor."4 3 The only time the President can override this
clause in the national economic interest of the United States is when the worst
form of child labor at issue is hazardous work.' If a developing country is
engaged in any unconditional worst form of child labor, it is automatically
excluded from participating in the US GSP.
In the case of Myanmar (formerly known as Burma), a country that has
continuously engaged in the worst forms of child labor, the United States has
taken further unilateral action. In 2003, it passed the Burmese Freedom and
Democracy Act ("BFDA") banning all imports from Myanmar.4" The Act
specifically cites the ILO Governing Body's resolution in 2000 regarding
Myanmar, the only time the ILO has ever invoked its Article 33 powers.46
Myanmar is an example of trade-labor linkage that failed at the
international level but has been successfully implemented unilaterally by the
United States on a national level. The ILO has long documented Myanmar's
continuous violations of international labor standards.4" After numerous reports
rejected by the Myanmar government as false, and without any improvements in
the working conditions (which included children involved in forced labor for the
military), the ILO exercised its Article 33 powers in 2000 and recommended to
the Conference that further action be taken to secure compliance. 48 Despite
these recommendations, the ILO has not implemented any enforcement
measures against Myanmar. In fact, instead of the ILO threatening Myanmar
with the public shame of expulsion from the ILO, the Myanmar government is
threatening to withdraw from ILO membership. At the ILO's March 2006
Governing Body meeting, the ILO stated it would "review further action to be
42 19 USC § 2467(6) (2000).
43 19 USC § 2462(b)(2)(H) (2000).
44 19 USC § 2462(b)(2) (2000).
45 Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003, Pub L No 108-61, 117 Star 864 (2003), codified
at 50 USC § 1701 (Supp 2003).
46 See id at § 2(10).
47 See ILO, Report of ILO Commission of Inquiy Reveals Widespread and Sjstemic Use of Forced Labour in
Myanmar (Burma), Doc No ILO/98/32 (Aug 20, 1998), available online at
<http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/inf/pr/1998/32.htm> (visited Apr 22, 2006); ILO,
Forced Labour Persists in Myanmar (cited in note 19).
48 Id; see Jeremy Sarkin and Marek Pietschmann, Legitimate Humanitarian Intervention under International
Law in the Context of the Current Human Rights and Humanitarian Crisis in Burma (Myanmar), 33 Hong
Kong LJ 371, 383 (2003).
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taken" without indicating any sort of concrete measures it intended to pursue
against Myanmar.49
While the ILO has been unable to generate consensus on a proper
international enforcement measure against Myanmar, its standards have been
incorporated into the BFDA. Specifically, the US import ban will remain in place
until certain conditions have been met, including a requirement that the
government "no longer systematically violates workers rights, including the use
of forced and child labor, and conscription of child-soldiers."5 ° This
determination is to be made by the Secretary of State "after consultation with
the ILO Secretary General."
51
Several points can be made regarding the trade-labor link created by the
BFDA. First, although the United States has acted unilaterally, the BFDA has
brought a certain level of enforcement to the ILO's findings, which is more than
the ILO has been able to do thus far. In addition, despite its unilateral nature,
the Act has a higher degree of legitimacy because it relies on the findings of the
ILO, a multilateral international organization.52 Finally, the United States' action
at the national level has freed the ILO to continue doing what it does best-
monitoring and reporting on labor violations using a cooperative approach. The
ILO can continue to try and maintain a dialogue with Myanmar without
worrying about balancing its reporting and monitoring tasks against its role as an
enforcer.
2. Bilateral Trade Agreements: The US-Cambodia Bilateral
Textile Agreement
The US-Cambodia Bilateral Textile Agreement incorporated trade benefits
that were triggered by compliance with Cambodian laws and international labor
standards. Passed in 1999, renewed in 2001, and ultimately expired in 2004, the
agreement adopted a carrot approach to trade-labor linkage.53 Specifically, if
Cambodia's garment factories complied with Cambodia's own labor laws and
4 ILO, ILO Governing Body Concludes 295th Session-Considers Labour Situation in Myanmar
and Belarus, As Well As Globalization and Migration Issues, Doc No ILO/06/10 (Mar 31, 2006),
available online at <http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/inf/pr/20O6/lO.htm> (visited
Apr 22, 2006).
50 Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003 § 3(a)(3)(A), 117 Stat at 864 (cited in note 45).
51 Id.
52 See Trebilcock and Howse, 14 Minn J Global Trade at 282-83 ("The absence of criticism
suggests that there is tolerance of unilateral action by the international community where that
action is preceded by a clear multilateral determination that the country concerned is an egregious
violator of core labor rights and that cooperative approaches for addressing the situation have
been exhausted.') (cited in note 3).
53 Hiatt and Greenfield, 26 Mich J Ind L at 55 (cited in note 6).
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international labor standards, then the country was entitled to a 14 percent
annual increase in its textile quota.54 The unique aspect of the agreement was
that instead of the United States making this determination in isolation, which
could be viewed as arbitrary, or basing the determination on private company
disclosures or NGO monitoring, both of which could be viewed as biased, the
two countries agreed to use the ILO to determine compliance. The ILO
monitored nearly all of Cambodia's 230 textile factories for labor compliance.55
Although Cambodia has a fairly stringent labor code, which it implemented
in 1996, the country lacked the resources to monitor and enforce the law.56 The
Bilateral Textile Trade Agreement created incentives for private garment
factories to voluntarily comply with national laws and international standards
without any further action by the Cambodian government. In 1998, Cambodia's
textile exports to the United States accounted for $308 million in trade. By 2001,
this number had increased to $650 million due to the increase in Cambodia's
allotted quota from labor compliance. 7
The Bilateral Trade Agreement has been credited with improving worker
conditions in Cambodia's textile industry. In a survey of Cambodia's largest
textile buyers in 2004, the buyers indicated that Cambodia had the best labor
standards of all the Asian countries with which they did business. 8 Despite the
end to the Bilateral Trade Agreement, the ILO continues to monitor factory
compliance in Cambodia. Private companies that had pulled out of Cambodia
due to labor violations have begun to return to certain factories with the
requirement that these factories show their ILO monitoring reports to the
companies.59 The companies view the ILO favorably and its monitoring reports
grant legitimacy and comfort to the companies' decisions to return to
Cambodia.6" The Bilateral Trade Agreement is an example of trade-labor linkage
at the national level using ILO monitoring and reporting systems. The
Agreement successfully implemented labor improvements in Cambodia instead
of waiting for international trade-labor linkage, which has yet to happen. The
ILO was able to provide legitimacy to an agreement between two public actors,
54 Id at 56.
55 Id.
56 See Kevin Kolben, Trade, Monitoring and the ILO: Working to Improve Conditions in Cambodia's
Garment Factories, 7 Yale Hum Rts & Dev LJ 79, 83 (2004) (citing numerous typical violations).
57 Id at 82.
58 ILO and Better Factories-Cambodia, World Bank Survy of Texile and Garment Buyers Sourmng in
Cambodia (2004), available online at <http://www.betterfactories.org/content/documents/
WB%20survey.pdf> (visited Apr 22, 2006).
59 Kolben, 7 Yale Hum Rts & Dev LJ at 105-06 (cited in note 56).
60 Id.
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and the benefits of its monitoring and reporting process have now trickled over
into the private arena.
V. CONCLUSION
Many international policymakers and lawmakers argue for an international
trade-labor link. But given the lack of consensus on the theory and the absence
of a multilateral organization with the appropriate structure-much like the
theory of a decentralized, hybrid international court-a trade-labor linkage
would be better pursued at the national level. Developed countries such as the
United States can create unilateral or bilateral trade arrangements through which
trade benefits or sanctions are not determined by individual countries but by
ILO findings. The United States has already incorporated ILO findings into
several of its trade agreements. Since the ILO's tripartite structure makes it
uniquely able to provide legitimacy and transparency to this process, this
Development proposes that countries should continue to pursue trade-labor
linkage at the national level and make trade benefits or sanctions explicitly linked
to ILO assessments and reports.
The trade-labor link is particularly relevant in the context of child labor,
especially in regard to its worst forms. It is difficult to argue that countries
imposing such a linkage are doing so for protectionist motives and not for the
sake of human rights, but even with regard to the worst forms of child labor, the
creation of international trade-labor linkage has failed. Although a strong
international system has not been feasible in this situation, the goal of improving
child labor conditions globally can still be achieved through a nationalized
process. By nationalizing the trade-labor linkage for child labor, countries can
utilize the ILO's multilateral structure for determining labor violations while
freeing up the ILO to focus on its extensive monitoring and reporting processes.
In turn, the ILO can continue its cooperative negotiations to improve child
laborer conditions around the world without being concerned that political
capital is being lost in the enforcement process. Much like the proposed hybrid
international court, where the court's impact would be felt more slowly but
ultimately would be more lasting,6 the nationalized trade-labor linkage based on
ILO standards would be more effective in providing enforcement against child
labor violators than trying to create a strong international system.
61 Turner, 41 StanJ Intl L at 3 (cited in note 9).
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